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Summary 
One of the challenges that Congress will face as it considers 
major health reform legislation this year will be identifying 
the necessary financing. Many have suggested that reducing 
or eliminating the tax exclusion of employer-sponsored 
health insurance (ESI) could generate significant additional 
tax revenue to fund expansions in health insurance coverage. 
In this paper, we discuss the revenue and distributional 
consequences of several policy options that would alter 
the ESI tax exclusion. We focus on two specific policy 
design elements: (1) a cap, or dollar limit, on the amount of 
employer-sponsored health insurance premiums excluded 
from taxable income; and (2) an index that determines how 
this cap might grow over time. We present first year (2010) 
and 10-year (2010-2019) revenue estimates for all options 
and distributional impacts in 2019 for selected options. The 
distributional impacts include income and payroll taxes even 
though payroll tax revenue would not be available to fund 
health reform, because any decreases in benefits resulting 
from the tax changes would eventually return to workers as 
higher wages that would be subject to both types of taxes.
Even the policy option generating the least estimated 
revenue—capping the ESI premium exclusion at the 
75th percentile of premiums and indexing by medical 
expenses—would generate $62 billion in new income tax 
revenue over 10 years relative to current law, but maintain 
the vast majority (97 percent) of the tax subsidy from the 
current ESI exclusion.  This policy change would increase 
taxes for only 14 percent of tax units in 2019. Alternatively, 
indexing a 75th percentile cap more slowly over time would 
generate considerably more income tax revenue—$224 
billion using a GDP index—but would increase taxes for 
almost 40 percent of tax units in 2019. Because high-income 
households are more likely to have ESI, each of the policies 
modeled would increase taxes for relatively fewer lower-and 
middle-income tax units compared with those in the top 
two income quintiles. 
Setting the cap on the exclusion at the median of ESI 
premiums would generate about twice as much tax revenue 
in the first year as applying a cap set at the 75th percentile 
of premiums. Over time, however, the relative revenue 
gains would depend on how the cap is indexed. If the cap 
is indexed to grow more slowly than medical expenditures, 
a 75th percentile cap would increase revenues by only 
between 16 percent and 34 percent less over 10 years  
than a median cap.
In 2010, under every policy option examined, affected 
tax units in each income quintile would see their after-tax 
income fall less than 1 percent. However, the burden would 
increase over time because projected ESI premiums grow 
faster than the caps. Some reform options would increase 
average federal taxes substantially by 2019, but the average 
percentage changes in after-tax income would be relatively 
modest for most income quintiles and most index options. 
For example, imposing a 75th percentile cap indexed by 
GDP growth would increase federal taxes by an average 
of $550 in 2019 for affected tax units in the lowest income 
quintile—reducing after-tax income by an average of 3.9 
percent. Those in the top income quintile would experience 
an average reduction in after-tax income of 0.7 percent—
about $1,920 in 2019. Much of the additional tax paid by 
lower-and middle-income tax units would come from payroll 
taxes. Retaining the exclusion for payroll taxes would make 
the reform more progressive but would forgo substantial 
additional funding for Social Security and Medicare. 
Our analysis shows that limiting the ESI tax exclusion could 
be an important component of financing health reform. 
The extent of the impact on overall health care costs 
depends, in part, on whether this causes employees to 
demand plans that are less expensive in order to keep their 
premium under a cap, or whether employees are likely to 
accept a plan with a higher premium even if some portion 
of the premium is taxed. Any effects on cost growth would 
likely be modest, given that the vast majority of the current 
tax exclusion would remain in place. In any case, limiting 
the tax exclusion would not only provide funding for 
health reform but would also mitigate the huge inequities 
built into the current treatment of employer contributions 
to premiums. 
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Introduction
One of the challenges that Congress will 
face as it considers major health reform 
legislation this year will be identifying 
the necessary financing. The Obama 
Administration wants health reform 
to be “deficit neutral,” but financing 
proposals have thus far fallen short of 
the estimated costs of comprehensive 
reform.1 Many have suggested that 
changes to the tax exclusion of 
employer-sponsored health insurance 
(ESI) could generate significant 
additional tax revenues that Congress 
could use to fund significant expansions 
in health insurance coverage. In this 
paper, we discuss the revenue potential 
and distributional consequences of 
several policy options that would alter 
the ESI exclusion. 
The federal tax code subsidizes the 
purchase of ESI by excluding from 
federal income and payroll taxes 
premiums paid on employees’ behalf.2 
This exclusion reduced federal tax 
revenues by an estimated $246 billion 
in 2007, making it by far the largest 
single subsidy in the tax code.3 Most 
Americans under the age of 65 get 
their health insurance through an 
employer—partly because of these 
generous tax subsidies, but perhaps 
more importantly, because ESI promotes 
risk sharing across employee groups. 
Many people feel that national health 
reform should leave ESI coverage largely 
untouched; thus, the policy maker’s 
mantra for this reform effort is “if you 
like the coverage that you have, you can 
keep it.”
This paper compares the tax revenue 
and distributional effects of alternative 
approaches to limiting the current 
federal tax exclusion for ESI coverage.4 
We focus on two specific policy design 
elements: (1) imposing a cap, or dollar 
limit, on the amount of the premiums 
for employer-sponsored health coverage 
excludable from taxable income, that 
is, “capping” the exclusion, and (2) 
allowing the cap to grow over time, 
that is, “indexing” the cap.5 We present 
one-year and ten-year revenue estimates 
for all options and distributional 
impacts for selected options. Estimates 
of individual income tax and payroll 
tax revenue are presented separately 
and in aggregate. Payroll tax revenue 
is typically targeted to finance Social 
Security and Medicare and, therefore, 
would not be available to fund health 
reform. However, we include payroll 
taxes in this analysis for two reasons. 
First, if employers would respond 
either by dropping their offer of ESI 
or by decreasing premiums by the 
amount that falls above a cap, these 
decreases in non-taxed benefits 
would eventually get passed back to 
employees as higher wages, subject 
to both income and payroll taxes. 
Second, the payroll tax falls more 
heavily on those with lower incomes; 
omitting the impact of increases in 
payroll tax in the distributional analyses 
would be misleading. We conclude 
with a discussion of design and 
implementation issues policymakers 
should consider when modifying the 
current ESI tax exclusion.
Undesirable Consequences 
of the Current Tax 
Exclusion
The current tax exclusion is 
regressive. Because it reduces taxable 
income, the exclusion is worth more to 
taxpayers in higher tax brackets than 
to those facing lower tax rates.6 Not 
taxing a $10,000 premium, for example, 
saves a taxpayer in the 35 percent top 
tax bracket $3,500 but reduces the tax 
bill for someone in the 15 percent tax 
bracket by just $1,500. In addition, the 
value of the tax exclusion is greater for 
those with higher incomes, who tend 
to have jobs with richer benefits, and 
smaller for lower-income employees, 
who are much less likely to have 
ESI coverage.7 Thus, the current tax 
exclusion disproportionately subsidizes 
those with higher incomes.
The current tax exclusion can 
contribute to high and accelerating 
health care costs. Although wages 
and benefits trade off, at least in the 
long run, employees tend to view the 
selection of an ESI plan as independent 
from their wages. Insulation from 
the full costs of health care—and the 
lack of transparency in the trade-off 
between wages and benefits—may 
drive up overall health care costs by 
spurring greater demand for health 
insurance that combines benefits, 
networks, and management features in 
more expensive ways than employers 
and employees might otherwise 
demand.8 This can drive up overall 
health care costs. 
The current tax exclusion reduces 
federal government revenues 
substantially, and these losses may 
grow over time.9 The ESI exclusion 
will reduce federal tax revenues by an 
estimated $3.5 trillion between 2010 
and 2019.10 In fact, the revenue loss 
could be substantially more if employee 
compensation shifts substantially 
from wages and salaries to employer 
contributions for health insurance 
premiums, as recent simulations 
suggest. Holahan et al. (2009) estimate 
that employers’ premium contributions 
will increase from 9.8 percent of 
total compensation in 2009 to 15.3 
percent in 2019; as a result, taxable 
compensation will decrease as a share 
of total compensation.11 Thus, even if 
total compensation grows at the same 
rate as GDP, both income and payroll 
taxes would decrease substantially as a 
share of GDP.12 This could have serious 
adverse consequences for programs 
funded primarily by payroll taxes, 
particularly Social Security’s Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) program and Medicare’s 
Hospital Insurance (HI) program.
Options for Limiting the  
Tax Exclusion for 
Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance
Before considering the effects of 
changes in the ESI tax exclusion, we 
show tax expenditures associated 
with the current ESI tax exclusion and 
projected expenditures over the next 
decade to provide a baseline against 
which to compare reform options. We 
model eight options for limiting the 
ESI tax exclusion using two different 
initial exclusion caps and four different 
indexing options:
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•	A cap on the amount of the ESI 
premium that is excludable from 
taxable income,13 set at one of two 
levels:
  › the median (i.e. the 50th 
percentile) ESI premiums for single 
coverage, single-plus-one coverage, 
and family coverage in 2009,14 or 
  › the 75th percentile of ESI 
premiums for single coverage, 
single-plus-one coverage, and family 
coverage in 2009.15 
These caps were chosen as examples 
of where a cap might be set. Other 
options for a cap might include 
different points in the ESI premium 
distribution (for example, the 90th 
percentile) or a specific premium from 
a nationwide health plan, such as the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan 
(FEHBP).16 
•	An index rate at which the cap is 
assumed to grow over time, using one 
of four rates:
  › no growth, or “unindexed,” 
  › the rate of overall price inflation 
defined by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), 
  › the rate of overall growth in the 
economy defined by Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth,17 or 
  › the rate of medical expense 
growth, defined by the growth rate 
of National Health Expenditures 
(NHE).18 
The last three approaches were 
presented as options for indexing a tax 
exclusion cap by the Senate Finance 
Committee.19 
Methods
The estimates in this paper come 
from the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center Microsimulation Model.20 For 
a nationally representative sample of 
tax units, the tax model calculates tax 
liability under current law and under 
alternative policy options. A tax unit is 
an individual or married couple who 
files an income tax return—or would 
file if their income were high enough—
plus their dependents.21 Calculations 
of tax liability for each tax unit form 
the basis for estimated changes in 
government tax revenue resulting 
from implementation of each policy 
alternative.22 The primary data source 
for the tax model is the 2004 Public Use 
File (PUF) produced by the Statistics of 
Income Division (SOI) of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). Health insurance 
coverage for 2004 from the March 2005 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement 
was statistically matched to the SOI 
by common characteristics in the 
datasets. Premiums are benchmarked 
to the average reflected in the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey – Insurance 
Component (MEPS-IC) 2004 data.23 
We age the data to represent the 
demographic, income, tax, health, 
health expenditure, and employment 
characteristics of the civilian, non-
institutionalized population of the 
United States from 2010 to 2019. The 
population and patterns of health 
insurance coverage of the United 
States in years 2010 to 2019 are based 
on projections from the Census 
Bureau.24 Wages are grown from 2010 
to 2019 using forecasts developed by 
the Congressional Budget Office.25 
Premiums are calculated for each year 
based on medical expenditures, and 
thus “grow” by the rate of medical 
expense growth26 and changes in 
coverage.27 For policy options involving 
a cap on the amount of the ESI premium 
that is excludable from taxable income, 
the cap is applied to employees based 
on the ESI coverage type chosen in 2004 
(i.e. single, single-plus-one, or family), 
regardless of family structure or tax 
filing status. We assume that the health 
insurance choices of households and 
employers do not respond to changes in 
the cost of health insurance.28 All dollars 
are reported in 2009 terms.
Tax Revenues Collected In 
the First Year (2010) and 
over 10 Years (2010-2019) 
Currently, the exclusion generates tax 
expenditures estimated to be $240 
billion in 2010 and $3.5 trillion over 10 
years (see table 1). Income taxes account 
for about two-thirds of the total—$145 
billion in 2010 and $2.2 trillion over 10 
years. Thus eliminating the ESI exclusion 
entirely could generate substantial tax 
revenues relative to the estimated cost of 
achieving healthcare reform. However, 
this could also weaken the employer-
based insurance system by removing the 
current subsidies for coverage. 
Limiting the amount of the ESI premium 
that is excludable from taxable income 
would affect far fewer taxpayers 
and generate far less revenue than 
completely removing the exclusion. If 
the tax exclusion were capped at the 
median premium level, half of those 
with ESI would not face increased taxes. 
Those whose premiums fall above the 
median would owe tax on the amount 
by which their premium exceeds the 
median premium; they would not be 
taxed on the full value of their premium. 
Because everyone would still receive an 
exclusion up to the median premium 
level, the revenue generated would be 
far smaller than doing away with the 
exclusion altogether. Relative to setting 
the cap at median premium level, 
setting the cap at the 75th percentile 
of premiums would affect an even 
smaller share of the premium (the 
amount of the premium that exceeds the 
75th percentile) for a smaller share of 
enrollees (the 25 percent who pay the 
highest premiums).
While a cap could reduce revenue 
relative to removing the exclusion 
entirely, it would still generate enough 
income tax revenue to provide 
significant potential funding for health 
care reform. An unindexed cap set at 
the median premium could generate 
$13 billion dollars in income taxes in 
2010, similar to the amount that would 
be generated using the CPI to index the 
cap.29 Using GDP growth to index the 
cap would raise $17 billion in income 
taxes in 2010, while applying a medical 
expenditures index would only draw in 
$8 billion in 2010. In 2010, for any given 
indexing option, setting the cap at the 
75th percentile of ESI would generate 
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about half as much tax revenue as 
setting the cap at the median.
Regardless of the initial level of the 
cap, more restrictive indexing (i.e., 
no indexing or indexing based on the 
CPI or GDP) means that, over time, the 
cap would affect an increasing share 
of the premium for a growing share 
of taxpayers. In contrast, if indexed 
by medical expenses, the cap and the 
premium would move together over 
time. This means that the share of the 
premium exceeding the tax exclusion 
and the share of taxpayers subject to 
additional taxes would remain steady. 
As a result, indexing the cap on the tax 
exclusion by medical expenses would 
lead to the slowest growth in revenues 
relative to the other indices.30 
The level of the cap and the index 
chosen interact in their effects on the 
amount of revenue raised over time. 
When the index grows more slowly than 
premiums, the difference in revenue 
raised over time between a median and 
a 75th percentile cap is smaller. When 
the index is less restrictive, the choice of 
the initial level of the cap matters more. 
For example, under an unindexed cap, 
shifting from a median cap on ESI to a 
cap at the 75th percentile would reduce 
income tax revenue by 16 percent 
over 10 years.31 At the other extreme, 
indexing at the same rate at which 
premiums are assumed to grow, a cap at 
the 75th percentile of premiums would 
decrease income tax revenue by about 
53 percent relative to a median premium 
cap on the ESI exclusion. 
Although any of these options would 
generate many billions of additional tax 
revenue, each option would recover 
only a small share of the current ESI 
exclusion (figure 1) and would likely 
disrupt the employer-based system only 
marginally. Even the most aggressive 
option—an unindexed median cap—
would recover only about a third of the 
revenue lost because of the current ESI 
exclusion. A 75th percentile cap indexed 
by GDP would yield $224 billion in 
income tax revenue over 10 years, but 
leave 90 percent of the current tax 
subsidies in place. Imposing a 75th 
percentile cap indexed by medical 
expenses would recoup only 3 percent 
of the current ESI exclusion over 10 
years. But even under this modest 
option, income tax revenues would still 
increase by $62 billion over 10 years, 
and each of the alternatives would face 
fewer risks than doing away with the 
exclusion altogether. 
Table 1. Income and Payroll Tax Revenue for Various Reforms of the ESI Exclusion in 2010 and 2010-2019
First Year Tax Revenue in Billions $,  
2010
10 Year Tax Revenue in Billions $,  
2010-2019
Income tax Payroll tax Total Income tax Payroll tax Total
Value of current ESI tax exclusion $145 $96 $240 $2,242 $1,297 $3,539
Reforms of ESI tax exclusion
Index Initial cap
Unindexed
Median $13 $9 $22 $722 $421 $1,142
75th percentile $7 $5 $12 $608 $354 $962
CPI
Median $13 $9 $22 $576 $337 $914
75th percentile $7 $4 $11 $456 $266 $722
GDP
Median $10 $7 $17 $341 $199 $541
75th percentile $5 $3 $8 $224 $130 $354
Medical Expenses
Median $8 $5 $13 $133 $77 $210
75th percentile $4 $2 $6 $62 $35 $97
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0309-1).
Notes: Baseline is current law. See text for reform option descriptions and the median and 75th percentile of premiums for single coverage, single-plus-one coverage, and family coverage.
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The Distribution of Tax 
Increases by Income  
in 2019
How many would pay higher taxes? 
Removing the exclusion would increase 
income and payroll taxes for virtually all 
tax units with ESI by the end of the 10 
year period. Across all tax units—with 
or without ESI coverage, 43 percent 
would face increased taxes in 2019 
due to removing the exclusion (table 
2, top panel).32 Regardless of the index 
chosen and even with an initial cap set 
at the 75th percentile, nearly everyone 
with ESI would pay higher taxes in 
2019.33 A smaller share of the lower-
income tax units have ESI coverage, 
so they would be much less likely to 
pay higher taxes compared with those 
in the higher quintiles of income. 
For example, removing the exclusion 
would increase taxes for just 14 percent 
of tax units in the lowest quintile in 
2019. But taxes would increase for 
31 percent in the second quintile, 56 
percent in the middle quintile, and 
more than 60 percent of those in the 
two highest quintiles. These shares are 
similar whether the cap is unindexed 
or indexed by CPI or GDP growth. 
However, far fewer tax units would 
experience a tax increase when the 
75th percentile of premium is indexed 
by medical expenses: only 14 percent 
of tax units with ESI would pay higher 
taxes in 2019 and the effects across 
income quintiles would range from 
4 percent of poorest tax units to 24 
percent of the richest.
How much would taxes increase  
for those paying higher taxes? 
Among tax units with a tax increase, 
there is wide variation in the estimated 
average change in 2019 federal income 
and payroll taxes across quintiles of 
income and across reform options 
(table 2, middle panel).34 If the entire 
exclusion were to be removed, tax 
units with tax increases would pay, on 
average, between $3,780 more for those 
in the lowest quintile of income and 
$9,670 more for those in the highest 
quintile of income in 2019.35 However, 
this option may seem too potentially 
disruptive to ESI coverage. Under the 
other options, tax units paying higher 
taxes in the lowest quintile of income 
would pay, on average, between $190 
(with a 75th percentile cap indexed by 
medical expenses) and $1,450 (with an 
unindexed 75th percentile cap) more 
in federal taxes.36 Those in the middle 
quintile of income tax units would pay, 
on average, between $380 and $2,340 
more. Those with a tax increase in the 
top quintile of income tax units would 
see an increase in federal taxes of, on 
average, between $960 and $4,350. 
The upward trend in the average tax 
increases across the income quintiles 
clearly illustrates that the biggest 
benefits of the current tax exclusion 
have been accruing to those with 
the highest incomes. But, even after 
limiting the ESI exclusion, the remaining 
exclusion would still disproportionately 
benefit those with higher incomes.
How would after-tax incomes be 
affected? 
Measuring income and payroll tax 
increases relative to a tax unit’s ability-
to-pay gives a better sense of the burden 
they impose. In 2010, after-tax income 
for those with a tax increase would fall 
less than 1 percent for each quintile of 
income under every policy option with 
a cap (data not shown). The impact, 
however, would increase over time. 
Although these reform options can 
cause fairly substantial average federal 
tax increases in 2019, the average 
percentage changes in after-tax income 
would be relatively modest for most 
income quintiles and most options with 
an indexed cap (table 2, lower panel). 
If we impose a 75th percentile cap 
indexed by GDP growth, tax units with 
a tax increase in the lowest quintile of 
income would have after-tax income 
reduced by an average of 3.9 percent. 
Those in the top income quintile would 
experience an average reduction in 
after-tax income of 0.7 percent. Indexing 
by medical expenses would decrease 
average after-tax income for those with 
a tax increase by 1.3 percent for those 
in the lowest income quintile and by 
0.4 percent for those in the highest 
income quintile in 2019. However, 
under an unindexed cap and a cap 
indexed by CPI—the strictest indexing 
constraints—those with tax increases 
in the lowest income quintile would 
experience larger reductions in after-tax 
Figure 1.  Share of ESI Tax Exclusion Subsidies Recovered  
from Selected Policy Options, 2010-2019
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income of 10.3 percent and 7.4 percent 
in 2019, respectively. Those in the 
other income quintiles would generally 
experience a smaller change in their 
after-tax incomes.
Other Policy Design Issues 
The primary goals of changing the ESI 
exclusion would be raising revenues to 
finance health care reform, mitigating 
the huge inequities in the current 
policy, and providing incentives that 
might limit health care spending. 
Attaining those goals requires not just 
capping the ESI exclusion but also 
constraining other tax subsidies for 
health spending. To that end, policy 
makers need to count all forms of tax-
advantaged employer health benefits 
Initial Cap on ESI Exclusion at the 75th Percentile of Premium
Remove current 
ESI tax exclusion
Indexing Option
Unindexed CPI GDP Medical expenses
Income by quintile1,2
Percent of tax units with tax increase in 20193
Lowest quintile 14.0 % 13.6 % 13.3 % 11.7 % 4.3 %
Second quintile 31.2 31.1 30.6 27.4 9.5
Middle quintile 55.5 55.4 54.5 49.4 18.3
Fourth quintile 64.5 64.5 63.3 58.5 22.4
Top quintile 65.3 65.3 64.3 59.9 23.9
All 42.6 42.4 41.7 38.1 14.3
Average change in federal income and payroll tax  among tax units with tax increase in 20194
Lowest quintile $3,780 $1,450 $1,050 $550 $190
Second quintile $4,500 $1,960 $1,470 $810 $320
Middle quintile $5,460 $2,340 $1,760 $980 $380
Fourth quintile $7,560 $3,340 $2,540 $1,430 $650
Top quintile $9,670 $4,350 $3,320 $1,920 $960
All $6,670 $2,930 $2,220 $1,260 $570
Percent change in after-tax income among tax units with tax increase in 20195
Lowest quintile -26.8 % -10.3 % -7.4 % -3.9 % -1.3 %
Second quintile -13.4 -5.9 -4.4 -2.4 -1.0
Middle quintile -9.7 -4.2 -3.1 -1.7 -0.7
Fourth quintile -8.1 -3.6 -2.7 -1.5 -0.7
Top quintile -3.7 -1.7 -1.3 -0.7 -0.4
All -8.6 -3.8 -2.9 -1.6 -0.7
Table 2.  Distribution of Income and Payroll Tax Change by Income Percentile for Various Reforms of the  
ESI Exclusion, 2019
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version0309-1).
Notes: Baseline is current law. See text for reform option descriptions and the 75th percentile of premiums for single coverage, single-plus-one coverage, and family coverage. 
(1) Cash income is a more comprehensive measure of income than adjusted gross income (AGI). For example, cash income includes such items as untaxed social security and pension benefits, unreal-
ized capital gains, tax-exempt employee benefits, and tax-exempt interest. For this analysis, tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. 
For a more detailed description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm 
(2) The cash income quintiles (fifths of the distribution) used in this table are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an equal number of people, not tax units. The top 
income for each quintile is (in 2009 dollars): 20%, $22,005; 40%, $41,316; 60%, $74,736; and 80%, $128,774. 
(3) Includes both filing and non-filing tax units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units.
(4) Average change in federal tax includes changes in individual and corporate income tax, payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare, and the estate tax.
(5) After-tax income is cash income less: individual income tax net of refundable credits; corporate income tax; payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare); and estate tax. The calculation of percent 
change in after-tax income assumes that after-tax income is distributed uniformly within each quintile. If actual incomes within a quintile are positively skewed, the percentage change in after-tax income 
will be somewhat higher for the average unit.
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towards the cap and impose standards 
about the benefits a policy must 
have to qualify for any tax exclusion. 
Specifically,
•	Policymakers would have to change 
other tax subsidies for health care. 
Several health-related employer 
benefits, such as tax-free contributions 
to Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs)37 
should either (1) be eliminated or (2) 
reduced in value, dollar-for-dollar, so 
that the amount paid for premiums 
and these tax-free contributions would 
not exceed the cap on the ESI tax 
exclusion. Otherwise, health benefits 
formerly covered under the health 
plan with a capped premium would 
be shifted to coverage under other 
tax-advantaged means; this would 
reduce the tax revenue and potential 
cost containment effects of a change 
in the ESI tax exclusion.38  
•	Policymakers would need to require 
that any plan qualifying for the ESI 
tax exclusion satisfy minimum benefit 
standards to prevent employers from 
offering limited coverage options 
that would allow workers to game 
the system. For example, firms would 
not be allowed to offer plans that 
couples with two ESI offers could 
use to “build” a coverage package 
that would get around the cap on 
the tax exclusion.39 Otherwise, the 
revenue and cost containment effects 
of scaling back the ESI tax exclusion 
would be reduced.
In addition to these fundamental aspects 
to changes in the tax exclusion policy, 
policymakers may want to consider 
several other issues.
Allow the ESI exclusion to vary by 
household income. 
Even under the policy alternative 
that generates the least tax revenue, 
some tax units with lower incomes 
would face substantial tax increases. 
Policymakers could consider several 
policy design options that would further 
concentrate the tax increases on higher 
income individuals and families. An 
option proposed by Jonathan Gruber 
would implement a “progressive 
cap,”40 which would retain the full ESI 
exclusion for lower-income employees 
but cap the income tax exclusion at the 
median premium level for those with 
middle and higher incomes. The highest 
income employees would get no income 
tax exclusion. 
Another approach to lessen the tax 
impact among lower- and middle-income 
tax units would impose a cap on the 
ESI tax exclusion only for income taxes, 
while maintaining the full exclusion 
for payroll taxes. Since income taxes 
are more progressive than payroll 
taxes (i.e., lower-income individuals 
and families pay a larger share of their 
income in payroll taxes than higher-
income households) lower-income 
households would benefit relatively 
more from a payroll tax exclusion than 
from an income tax exclusion. Without 
the additional payroll tax revenues, the 
revenue gain from any particular policy 
option would decrease by more than 
one-third, but income tax revenues 
available to finance health reform would 
remain largely unchanged.
Allow the cap to vary by  
geographic area.
Implementing a fixed-dollar cap for all 
geographic areas would effectively make 
the tax exclusion more generous in some 
places than in others, since premiums 
vary geographically. Such variation 
may arise because of differences in the 
underlying costs of health care inputs 
(e.g., salaries and rents) or variation 
in medical practice styles and market 
conditions. Allowing full geographic 
variation in the cap on the tax exclusion 
might, however, subsidize less efficient 
areas to a greater degree relative to 
more efficient areas.41 Improving 
equity may trade off against improving 
efficiency, and policymakers would have 
to balance the two competing aims. 
Choosing higher percentiles for the 
cap would diminish this concern in the 
near term, regardless of the indexing 
option chosen, by reducing the share 
of the premium exposed to taxation 
and effectively limiting the potential 
inequities associated with geographic 
variation. However, this approach would 
also reduce revenue gains.
Allow the cap to vary by  
the risk status and size of the  
employer group.
Implementing a fixed-dollar premium 
cap could also impose tax penalties on 
the basis of enrollees’ health, generosity 
of plan benefits, and firm size. Tax 
increases would fall disproportionately 
on (1) high-cost enrollee groups if their 
premiums cover a significant share of 
their health expenditures and  
(2) employees of smaller firms whose 
higher premiums reflect higher 
administrative “loading” costs rather 
than richer benefit packages compared 
to larger firms.42 A cap based on 
actuarial value—in which actuaries 
value each plans’ covered benefits 
based on the hypothetical claims of a 
nationally representative population—
might address this concern.43 Although 
the actuarial-value cap could improve 
equity, it could also lock in current 
levels and patterns of health care 
spending and create additional 
complexity in the health insurance 
system.44 This inequity arises not from 
the cap per se, but from the limited 
ability to spread health care risk across 
a broad enrollee population, lack of 
economies of scale in administering and 
marketing plans, and weak competition 
in the private marketplace. The most 
efficient solution is not to adjust the cap, 
but rather to provide opportunities for 
greater risk pooling.
Summary and Discussion 
Limiting the tax exclusion for ESI 
premiums could provide a major source 
of financing for health reform. Even 
the policy option generating the least 
revenue—capping the ESI premium 
exclusion at the 75th percentile of 
premiums and indexing the cap by 
medical expenses—would increase 
tax revenues available for financing 
health reform by $62 billion over 10 
years relative to current law. These tax 
increases would come from only 14.3 
percent of tax units in 2019. Indexing 
the cap more slowly over time would 
generate considerably more revenue: 
more than three times as much using a 
GDP index and more than seven times as 
much using the CPI index. In addition, 
many more tax units would experience 
a tax increase with these latter 
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options—38.1 percent of tax units in 
2019 when indexing by GDP growth and 
41.7 percent of tax units in 2019 when 
indexing by the CPI. Each of the policies 
modeled would, however, increase taxes 
for relatively fewer lower-and middle-
income tax units compared with those 
in the top two income quintiles. 
Setting the cap on the exclusion at 
the 75th percentile of ESI premiums 
would generate about half as much 
additional tax revenue in the first year 
as applying a cap set at the median 
premium. Over time, however, the 
relative revenue gains would depend 
on how the cap is indexed. If the cap 
is indexed to grow more slowly than 
medical expenditures, a 75th percentile 
cap would reduce revenues by only 
between 16 percent and 34 percent 
over 10 years relative to the revenues 
associated with a median cap.
Much of the additional tax paid by 
lower-and middle-income tax units 
would come from payroll taxes, so 
retaining the exclusion for payroll 
taxes would make the reform more 
progressive but at the cost of forgoing 
potential new funding for Social Security 
and Medicare. Of course, the current 
policy collects no payroll taxes on 
employer-paid premiums; maintaining 
the exemption for payroll taxes would 
not make the existing situation worse. 
The additional income taxes would still 
provide substantial funds to expand 
eligibility and subsidize insurance.
Since reductions in after-tax income are 
generally not large relative to income 
for the majority of those with ESI, 
the incentives to seek more limited 
coverage may be weak.45 The extent of 
the impact on costs depends, in part, on 
whether limiting the exclusion causes 
employees to demand plans that impose 
greater cost sharing or that eliminate 
less-essential covered benefits in order 
to keep their premium under a cap, 
or whether employees are likely to 
accept a plan with a higher premium 
even if some portion of the premium is 
taxed. The difference in the impact on 
costs occurs because the former would 
tend to decrease service use (since 
the increase cost is formulated as an 
increase in out-of-pocket medical costs 
experienced by an employee at the time 
of the service), while the latter would 
tend not to decrease service use (since 
the increase in costs is formulated as 
an increase in household taxes on the 
premium—removed from health care 
delivery decisions). Any effects on cost 
growth would likely be modest, given 
that the vast majority of the current tax 
exclusion would remain in place. 
Any policy limiting the ESI tax exclusion 
would change one of the fundamental 
pillars upon which the current private 
health insurance system is built and, 
as such, could create uncertainty 
about how employer-sponsored 
coverage might change. Therefore, 
having guaranteed, affordable, and 
adequate coverage available for 
individual purchase would be a critical 
complement to modifications in the tax 
treatment of ESI. This is particularly 
important given that there would 
likely be a disproportionate impact of 
a cap on employees of small firms or 
employees of firms whose enrollees 
have high health costs as well as among 
firms in high-cost geographic areas. 
Although there could be complicated 
adjustments to the cap on the tax 
exclusion, a better approach for 
health reform would combine limits 
on the tax exclusion with policies 
that promote greater risk sharing and 
competition among insurance plans 
options in the context of a well-
structured health insurance exchange. 
This paper shows that limiting the ESI 
tax exclusion could be an important 
component of financing health reform 
and should be considered. Our analysis 
shows that one of the least aggressive 
options—a 75th percentile cap indexed 
by GDP growth—would produce $224 
billion in new income tax revenues over 
the coming decade while still preserving 
90 percent of the tax subsidies available 
under the current policy. In addition, 
limiting the exclusion would increase 
taxes more for high-income than low-
income taxpayers. Therefore, in addition 
to providing a source of funding for 
health reform and incentives for seeking 
less expensive coverage, limiting 
the tax exclusion would mitigate the 
huge inequities built into the current 
treatment of employer contributions to 
premiums.
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